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This research aimed to take scope of the relationship between the UK and the 
CSDP. It aimed to touch on how the UK moulded the CSDP into what it is 
today, and how it contributed through a variety of different ways namely; 
institutionally, monetarily and personnel. It also concluded that despite the UK 
leaving the EU, it is likely to still be involved through NATO links and bi-
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Chapter 1- Introduction and aim of the study 
 
1.1- The Reason for the Thesis 
 
If not for a vote across the Atlantic in November 2016, the June 2016 Brexit vote would have gone 
down as the most baffling political vote of 2016, if not the 21st Century. Why would a country remove 
itself from one of the largest trading blocs in world, especially when said trading bloc is right on their 
doorstep? Despite this, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union, and this was formally 
set after Article 50 (the leaving mechanism) was triggered in March 2017. This means that the UK 
and the EU have two years from March 2017 to work out the divorce document which will outline 
what the future relationship between the two will be. Whilst deciding what the future relationship of 
the two will be, many looked back at the 40-year history of the UK in the EU. Whilst the UK would 
never be accused of being a Europhile country, the result of the vote still came as a shock to many. 
Whilst the UK is an important player in many different aspects of the EU, the relationship between 
the UK and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is of interest. The reason for this 
interest is because the UK is one of the founding fathers of CSDP along with France and helped to 
build the institutions and decision-making process of CSDP. So, the withdrawal of the UK could see 
drastic changes to the CSDP. 
 
The CSDP is the defence policy of the European Union and is an extension of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) but differs to CFSP in the decision-making process as the CSDP is inter-
governmental rather than the community method of CFSP. EU Member States have given the CFSP 
supranational powers and institutions which allows it to act as the voice of all 28 Member States. 
CSDP on the other hand is inter-governmental, which means that member states drive the direction 
and policy and can choose what level of involvement they have with the policy.  
 
Many of my family are either in the military or had previously been in the military so I have always 
had an interest in defence, so naturally when studying the EU, I was naturally attracted to the CSDP 
and what the is like between the UK and the CSDP. There is no shortage of studies and research 
describing how the UK interacts with certain aspects of the CSDP, such as in the creation of the 
policy instruments or of their contributions to CSDP operations. But these studies have tended to 
focus on one aspect such as the history of the CSDP or even what the future relationship will look 
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like. This research will hope to look at the relationship between the UK and CSDP and try explaining 
how the UK has moulded the CSDP and tried to close the theorized capabilities-expectations gap? 
 
1.2- Structure of Thesis 
Chapter 1 Introduction to the Study- This Introduces the Study 
Chapter 2 Literature Review- this will be a review of previous literature which tries to explain the 
previous attempts to explain the EU as a Foreign Policy actor and the role the UK as played with the 
CSDP. Literature is also sprinkled throughout the other chapters were relevant. 
Chapter 3 European Defence Initiatives- This chapter will explain previous European defence and 
foreign policy initiatives from 1949 until 1998. At each step will describe the role that the UK has 
played at each step in the process. This will look at these from a variety of different sources, from 
scholarly articles to official policy documents from both the UK and the EU. 
Chapter 4 CSDP and its Key features- The time frame of this Chapter is from the Saint-Malo 
declaration in 1998 until 2018 and describes the relatively rapid development of foreign policy 
capability through the CSDP. It goes into detail about the funding mechanisms and instruments of 
CSDP.  
Chapter 5 The UK and CSDP- This chapter looks at how the UK specifically contributes to the CSDP, 
by way of personnel and material. This Chapter also looks at what the future relationship between the 












Chapter 2- Literature Review 
 
2.1-Setting the scene- Modern relevance and context 
 
The UK is a member of the EU’s so-called ‘big three’ (Whitman & Wolff, 2012, p. 10) along with 
France and Germany in terms of economic and population size and as their role as the drivers of EU 
policy. Importantly, the UK has one of the highest military expenditures in the world, one of the 
highest largest economies in the world (nominal GDP), holds a permanent seat of the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) and is a member of the G8. In other words, the UK is what you would 
consider a global actor in foreign policy. This one lead to one to assume that they would be using this 
influence and resources to be at the forefront of expanding the foreign policy capability of the EU. 
 
The June 2016 Brexit vote drew a shock globally as one of the EU’s most wealthy and influential 
members voted to leave the Union. Despite the ‘uneasy’ membership, the UK, or any member for that 
matter, was never truly ever expected to leave the EU. With the Brexit vote, the future role that the 
UK will play with the different EU institutions, and the question must be asked of what role did the 
UK play in the development of these institutions. This research will focus on one of these institutions, 
the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and what impact the UK had in moulding it. 
 
The UK was not a founding member of the European Economic Community (EEC) and did not join 
the EEC until 1973. The 1973 enlargement was the first enlargement of the EEC and saw Denmark, 
Ireland and the UK join Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The UK 
had unsuccessfully tried to join the EC in both 1961 and 1967 but was rejected both times by France 
but this rejection did not seem to dissuade the UK from trying to join again. Another important 
milestone in European Integration had happened just before the 1973 enlargement and that was the 
creation of the European Political Community (EPC) in 1970. In the years preceding the EPC saw no 
unified EC response to the increasingly public Vietnam War or even in their own backyard with the 
Prague Spring in 1968. Middle Eastern conflicts and the drop-in oil prices in the 1970’s further 
showed the need for a common position for the EEC members (Hill, 2002).  
 
Throughout the Cold War period, the collective defence of Europe was left to the auspices of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which had its strongest European supporter in the UK, 
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and this strong support for NATO will be expanded in Chapter 3 of this study. There had been 
attempts for European defence integration through the European Defence Community (EDC) and 
Western European Union (WEU). The EDC had failed to get off the ground and the WEU, had been 
largely ineffectual as EC member’s prioritised defence through NATO. The UK had been reluctant to 
increase European security and defence integration outside of NATO, while France wanted to have 
European defence integration and capability be expanded through the WEU. The end of the 1980’s 
saw the collapse of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact which raised questions about the necessity of 
NATO at a time where the EC was looking at both deepening its institutions and widening for more 
members to join (Schneider, 2014). With the collapse of the USSR this led to a unipolar world with 
the USA as the last remaining super and created a vacuum amongst the Eastern European states who 
had been part of the Warsaw Pact. 
 
While the USSR was collapsing the EC was in negotiations with its members over what would 
become the Maastricht Treaty, which came into power in 1993. The pillar system of the Maastricht 
Treaty was to signal closer integration with the consolidation of the existing communities and added 
capabilities which had been intergovernmental before the Treaty.  
 
The European communities’ pillar (1st pillar) consolidated the pre-existing community treaties; Treaty 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the Treaty Establishing the European 
Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), and the Treaty establishing the European Economic Union 
(Treaty of Rome). The two other pillars which were created, the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) (2nd pillar) which replaced the EPC and the Justice and Home Affairs (3rd pillar) which 
replaced TREVI, both the EPC and TREVI had been intergovernmental before the Maastricht Treaty.   
 
The Yugoslavian conflicts of the 1990’s showed that even though the now-named EU had CFSP, it 
still lacked cohesion, the capacity and a will to agree to action. This inaction and over reliance on 
diplomatic means would come at the cost of thousands of lives lost and displaced (Ginsberg, 2001). 
This failure would have two key consequences; it confirmed a continued need for NATO and the US 
in Europe, and it would finally see the convergence of directions for both France and the UK in terms 
of defence policy. This defence policy would come to ahead with the Saint-Malo declaration in 1998 
which was to outline the plan for autonomous EU defence capabilities. This sudden shift in UK 
defence policy surprised many because of their strong opposition to any policy strengthening defence 




The conflict in Yugoslavia would be the lead up to the Saint-Malo Conference, which is the founding 
moment and main driver of CSDP legislation. Chapter 3 and 4 will look at the events in more detail 
which brought the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)/CSDP to fruition and will look 
specifically at UK involvement in these events.  
 
2.2- Literature Review: European Union- What sort of actor? 
The terms 'Civilian Power (CPE)', 'Normative Power Europe (NPE)' and even 'soft power' have been 
used as descriptors by researchers when trying to explain the foreign policy of the EU and its 
predecessors. Diez in (Diez,2005) quoted in (Rogers, 2009, p. 832)explains how there is a novel 
notion of the EU has an external power because: "it is said to rely on civilian power rather than 
military means and to pursue the spread of particular norms, rather than geographical expansion or 
military superiority." Despite this characterisation of the EU as a 'civilian power' it does not mean that 
the EU necessarily saw themselves as a Civilian or Normative power as they have continuously tried 
to increase military capability since WW21. 
 
Since integrated EU defence policy is an extension of EU foreign policy, much of the previous 
literature that has been done on European defence policy has focused on how the EU, and its prior 
iterations, acted in foreign policy, why they took the actions that they took, and how that has shaped 
their desire for European defence policy. While there have been numerous studies done on the EU as 
a foreign policy actor (Laursen, 2009) (Howorth, 2010) (Tank, 1998) (Lucarelli & Menotti, 2006), 
this research will look at three which have proved to be popular in trying to explain why the EU acts 
as it does in the foreign policy field and how they could act in the future. The scholars and theories in 
question are François Duchêne and the civilian power concept, Christopher Hill and the capability-
expectations gap and Ian Manners and the normative power concept. After looking at the work of the 
three, this research will look at a sample of contemporary scholarly work on impact the UK has had in 
moulding CSDP. 
 
The uniqueness of the EC as a Foreign Policy actor has long been documented by scholars in the last 
50 years. How to classify this unique has long been a source of debate because it did not properly fit 
into existing schools of political thought. In a world dominated by two superpowers threatening 
mutual discussion in the USA and USSR, what was to be the role of a group of states stuck between a 
rock and a hard place? The role of EC foreign policy has been deconstructed and much of it focused 
                                                          
1 See Chapter 3 
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on the fact that the EC is sui generis as a foreign policy actor (Holland, 1994; Whitman, 1998; 
Ginsberg, 2001). 
 
 The EC, as explanations go, was sui generis because it did not fit the existing explanations on foreign 
policy actors and their supposed roles in the international systems, realist scholars have stressed the 
importance of states in the international system over supranational institutions (Waltz, 1979; Feldman, 
1999; Reichwein, 2015), with Feldman even suggesting that individual states hold the power in 
supranational systems. While not completely dismissive of the EC as an international actor, realist 
scholars focus on the undue effect powerful countries such as France and the UK have on the foreign 
policy direction of the union. 
 
2.3- The EU as a Civilian and Normative actor 
Francois Duchêne coined the term 'civilian power' (Duchêne,1973) when discussing the EC as a 
foreign policy actor in 1973. The EPC was still in its infancy at this period and the UK had just joined 
the EC and was in what Duchêne called a 'flux'. Duchene had described the EU as a civilian power 
which was power outside the traditional understandings of military and economic power.  
 
Duchene predicted this role for Europe because of where it was situated, and the lack of arms it 
possessed, Europe was at the juncture between the West and East and outside of the UK and France 
possessed no nuclear capabilities of its own. He theorized that because of these limitations the 
countries in question were forced to behave differently and would move away from 'quasi-military 
confrontation' and towards civilian and political processes (Duchêne, 1971a p.69; Duchêne, 1971).  
 
The idea of CPE is similar to the soft power theory pioneered by Joseph Nye in the 1980's in which he 
described the failing of American hard power i.e. Military and economic means. Since the first 
theorisation by Duchêne in the 1970's CPE became a popular discourse to explain the unique foreign 
policy role that the EC played in the cold war period (Rogers, 2009) (Bull, 1982) (Wagner, 2017). 
Questions began to be asked about the role of CPE after the Saint-Malo conference and the advent of 
ESDP/CSDP, could the EU still be a civilian power whilst eschewing its own defensive capabilities 
(Smith, 2000). Smith argued that the EU could still be considered a civilian power because European 
hard power capabilities lay within the auspices of NATO and not within ESDP(Smith,2000), while 
some suggested that with the addition of CSDP has muddled the EU's international identity away 
from a Civilian Power (Gebhard & Norheim-Martinsen, 2011). 
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The second theorization of the EU as an international actor has been the work of Ian Manners and his 
normative power concept. Normative power Europe (NPE) was theorized as the peaceful power of 
ideas and values, apart from economic and military power (Manners, 2002,2006; Whitman,2011). 
Manners argued that NPE had been developed over a 50-year period through its actions and that the 
EU possessed 5 key norms developed through its treaties and actions; Peace, liberty, democracy, rule 
of law and human rights (Manners,2002 p. 242). NPE was related closely to the concept of soft power 
and was seen by some scholars as being closely related to CPE (Diaz,2005). 
 
 2.4- What is the capabilities-expectations gap? 
Whilst Duchêne's works shaped much of the early discussion and views on the EPC as a foreign 
policy actor, the second cluster of work focused on the work of Christopher Hill and his capability-
expectations gap concept. The work of Hill came at an important time because it was at the juncture 
from when the EC was negotiating the Maastricht Treaty, and this was hoped to increase integration 
in the foreign policy field. 
 
 The capability-expectations gap first published in (Hill, 1993) and expanded upon in (Hill, 
1997,2002; Holland,1994; Toje,2008) focused on the difference between expectations (both internal 
& external) of what the EU was expected to achieve or role to play in the international system and 
what they could achieve with their resources and capabilities. 
 
Hill theorised that the EC would fill the position in the international order of the USSR after the end 
of the cold war, theorizing four functions that the EC had performed in the international system and 
six functions which they could perform in the future (see table 1).The capabilities-expectation gap 
was then expanded upon in (Tsuruoka,2004) in what was described as the expectations deficit- 








Table 1: Hill's conceptualization of the role the EC had played as an international actor 
and the possible future role 
The role of the EC as an international 
actor so far: 
Possible future functions of the EC 
 
1. The stabilization of Western Europe 1. A replacement for the USSR in the 
Global balance of power. 
2. Managing world trade 2. Regional pacifier 
3. Principal voice of the developed 
world in relations with the South 
3. Global intervener 
4. Providing a second western voice in 
international diplomacy  
4. Mediator of conflicts 
 5. Bridge between rich and poor 
 6. Joint supervisor of the world 
economy 
Sourced from:Hill, Christopher. "The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's 
International Role." Journal of Common Market Studies 31, no. 3 (1993): 312-315. 
 
This conceptualization by Hill would drive debate about the role of EC before the Maastricht Treaty 
and afterwards with the implementation of CFSP. The possible future role of the EC theorized by Hill 
in Table 1 was like what the WEU held themselves to in with the creation of the Petersburg tasks in 
1992. Despite Maastricht reforms of the EPC into CFSP there was still debate around the 
effectiveness of the EU as a foreign policy actor.   
Much of the literature pointed out the reforms and all though not insignificant, still relied too heavily 
on inter-governmental solutions and voluntary consensus (Holland, 1997; Hill,2002), Ginsberg 
suggesting a gap between what TEU drafters wanted and what transpired, with the result being debate 
centering around the process rather than the actual decisions (Ginsberg,1997). Holland did suggest 
that if consensus could be achieved then this gap could be bridged, and the EU could be an effective 
actor,  
"While accepting Hill's concern that there is real danger in the degree and number of 
expectations being placed on the EU, the South African experience showed that Europe, 
9 
 
when motivated and in common agreement, possessed the resources and instruments to 
match current expectations with capabilities"-(Holland, 1995). 
Chapter 3 will show that the EU had continuously tried to create further foreign policy 
instruments such as the CSDP, to combat expectations placed upon them both internally and 
externally. 
 
2.5- The role of the UK in CSDP 
The UK along with France is one of the two 'founding fathers' of CSDP because it was the Saint-Malo 
declaration in 1998 which the course for ESDP/CSDP integration. Previous research has noted that 
the Saint-Malo declaration was seen as when British and French defensive priorities converged2, 
France had been a supporter of defensive integration through the WEU, while the UK was focused on 
NATO integration (Guyomarch, et al,. 1998; Shearer,2007; Ricketts, 2017).  
 
Despite the leading role the UK played in the formation of an ESDP/CSDP, recent literature has 
focused on the role or lack of role the UK has played in developing CSDP in contemporary times. The 
UK has shifted from ‘leader-to laggard’ (Whitman, 2016b, p. 45) in terms of support towards the 
further development of the CSDP since their leading role at St Malo in 1998. Instead of increased 
CSDP integration and the expansion of common costs the UK has chosen to advance security interests 
through NATO and bilateral relations with EU member states (Whitman,2016,2017; Howorth, 2014; 
Sundberg & Zetterland, 2013). Howorth expands further in saying that since the early 2000’s the UK 
is more of a ‘spoiler’ rather than a driver of CSDP and has put breaks on further integration of CSDP 
since 2005 (Howorth, 2017, 2017a) and that the move towards ESDP integration was nothing more 
than an attempt to further their own national security interests (Howorth,2000), (Schaede, 2018). 
 
CSDP was seen by London as an ‘optional extra’ rather than an integral part of UK security and 
defence policy, which saw CSDP as a threat to NATO (Whitman, 2016). Whitman further suggests 
that the UK had been keen to keep CSDP as inter-governmental with the veto power, rather than go to  
the community method, because of a loss national foreign policy decision making to the EU. The UK 
had not only become a laggard but had actively vetoed plans to increase funding and expand 
integration towards CSDP through the Athena Mechanism for funding CSDP missions. Nováky 
                                                          
2 See Chapter 3 
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(Nováky, 2016) notes the previous research done on the technical issues and complexity of CSDP 
funding-and the unique and awkward intersection it sits on3.  
 
Scholars have also noted the relationship between NATO and CSDP, while called a so-called defence 
policy, the CSDP is focussed on conflict prevention while the defence of the European territory is the 
responsibility of NATO. Many have noted the constant calls by US sources about the need to 
strengthen the European pillar of NATO through increased funding and the assuming of leadership 
within NATO by EU Member States (Kirchner,2000; Demetriou, 2016; Howorth, 2018). This has 


















                                                          
3 See Chapter 4.8 
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Chapter 3- European defence integration before CSDP 
 
3.1- European foreign policy and defence integration- Historical Overview 
This chapter of the research provides an historical overview on foreign policy and defence initiatives 
undertaken in Europe in the aftermath of World War 2 up until the Saint-Malo declaration in 1998. 
This research will look at both foreign policy and defence initiatives is because defence initiatives fall 
under the foreign policy umbrella. The following chapter is chronologically ordered to analyse key 
events in European foreign policy and security integration with a specific look at what role the UK 
played in each step. 
 
The road towards European foreign policy and Europe’s defence integration is a road that has been 
marked by potholes, dead ends and even unfinished roads, this chequered history with many failed 
attempts at integration causing it to be somewhat of a ‘taboo’ subject (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 
2008). As mentioned in the previous chapter, the friction in defence integration lay between the two 
pre-eminent defence powers, the UK and France and the different paths each wanted EU defence 
integration to take. This friction is shown throughout the history of integration, much of these and 
their success are down to the will of the French or British administrations of the time. 
3.2- European Foreign Policy and Security Integration (1949-1998) 
Table 2: European Foreign Policy and Security Integration (1949-1998) 
Year/ period Treaty/event 
1949 Washington Treaty (NATO) 
1951 Treaty of Paris (ECSC) 
1952-1954 EDC, signing and non-ratification 
1954 WEU 
1957 Rome Treaty 
1964 Fouchet Plan 
1970 EPC 
1993 Maastricht Treaty 
1997 Amsterdam Treaty 
1998 Saint-Malo declaration 
Sourced from: (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 37). 
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This research is interest in what has happened previously in security and defence integration, so we 
can help to understand why the EU and its member states continued to develop in this field. Table 2 
outlines key dates and developments in European foreign policy and security integration this chapter 
will expand on below and give a general overview on each of these events giving a general on what 
happened at each step and expanding upon the role the UK played at each part of the process. This is 
unique because the UK played an important role even when it was outside of the EU. 
 
3.3 1949- The Creation of NATO 
 
The signing of the Washington Treaty in 1949 saw the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) which was tasked with the defence of Western Europe. The creation of NATO 
was to counterbalance the possible resurgence of Germany as an aggressive military power 
(Bibliographies, 2017), and the power of the Soviet Union and later, the Warsaw Pact4. The appeal to 
many of the Western European countries was Article 5, which espoused collective defence; if one 
country was attack then all allies would consider it an attack on themselves. This collective defence 
would theoretically allow the militarily weaker members of Western Europe to safeguard themselves 
against the Soviet Union. Despite NATO not being a solely European defence initiative, it has 
arguably had the most significant impact on European defence across the Cold War period. This was 
not the first attempt of the US to restructure Western Europe as the year before the Marshall Plan had 
been undertaken. The Marshall Plan was the economic rebuilding of Europe after World War 2 and 
was funded by the USA. 
 
Prior to the creation of the WEU and NATO there had been suggestions by exiled governments in 
London5 about the creation of an international security system. This international security system had 
been proposed in June 1942 by the exiled governments of Belgium, Norway and Denmark who 
presented a joint project made up of regional pacts across both sides of the Atlantic and Pacific and 
would guarantee collective security against parties in the Atlantic and Pacific (Yevgeny, 2011). 
Despite this proposal failing, it showed that after two devasting wars that there was appetite across 
both sides of the Atlantic for a new security architecture. 
NATO was not just an American brainchild but found strong support in the UK, who has been 
perhaps the strongest European supporter of the alliance. It was this support of NATO, that had led to 
                                                          
4 The Warsaw Pact was not created until West Germany joined NATO in 1955. 
5 Many exiled Governments were based in London during World War 2 
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such British scepticism over increased EU integration through other defence initiatives. This strong 
British support for NATO (as mentioned in the previous chapter) was contrasted strongly with France 
who had been the strong supporter of European defence integration through institutions such as the 
WEU. This anti-American flavour was especially present during the Presidency of Charles de Gaulle 
and peaked with the withdrawal of France from NATO in 1966. This withdrawal from NATO 
happened before the UK joined the EC in 1973, so when the UK joined the EC it became an important 
bridge to both organisations. This strong support has not wavered in recent years, with the UK being 
just one of four EU-NATO members who pay the NATO guideline of 2% defence spending. 
 
While NATO was key in the defence of mainland Europe during the Cold War, in recent times there 
have been questions over the relevancy of the security architecture. This does not mean that NATO 
has not been active, as shown through the UN-sanctioned NATO-led airstrikes against regime targets 
during the civil uprising in Libya in 2011 (Bloed, 2017). Many of the EU members in NATO took 
active part in either enforcing a no-fly zone or by actual force. While there was uncertainty over the 
future of the alliance after the Cold War, the different US administrations that have been in power 
since the fall of the Cold War have been in strong support of the alliance (Bush, 2002).  
 
3.4- 1951- The creation of the European Coal and Steel Community  
 
The first step in European Integration was the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) in 1951. Schumann declaration of 9 May 1950 by Robert Schumann, who was the Foreign 
Minister of France at the time was considered the start of European integration process. It was in this 
declaration where the joining of the French and German coal and steel communities was formerly 
proposed. It was thought that if these two and other countries were integrated in this way it would 
“make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible” (European Union, 2017) as coal and steel 
were the main ingredients in armament production.  
 
The importance of the Schumann declaration cannot be understated, as 9 May is celebrated today as 
Europe Day. So, while the Schumann declaration is the ideological start of the ECSC and its 
following iterations, the Treaty of Paris is the physical start date for the European Coal and Steel 
community amongst its six-member states; Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and 
Netherlands. The rationale behind this community seems to be simple for many of these countries, 
they had been devasted by conflict twice in the previous 20 years. Duke and Vahoonacker  (Duke & 
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Vanhoonacker, 2017, p. 26) suggest that it was easier for these countries to liberalise trade to create a 
political outcome rather than through foreign policy and political integration.  Despite this would 
signal the start of a ‘belief in a rules-based international order and multilateralism was born, which 
has become a constant theme across EU foreign policy attempts (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008). 
 
The UK did not join the ECSC in 1951, and instead of going down the route of supranationalism and 
multilateralism like the ECSC members, they nationalised their domestic coal and steel industry. The 
nationalisation of this industry had been a goal of the Labour Government in Britain so joining the 
ECSC over the nationalisation of this would have been politically difficult. This was coupled their 
own view of what role the UK played in the Commonwealth and as a bridge between the Europe and 
the US (Kenealy, 2016). 
 
3.5- EDC: The first French Attempt at a Defence Community   
 
The European Defence Community (EDC) was an attempt to create an integrated defence community 
amongst the members of Western Europe after World War 2. The EDC was based on a plan by French 
Prime Minister René Pleven and was called the Pleven Plan and came in response to the possibility of 
Germany re-arming (Hunter, 2002). Even though 1952 was when the Treaty was signed but had been 
in negotiation for years before that and it was non-ratified by the French Government in 1954 which 
effectively killed it. The EDC was to be similar in composition to the ECSC the Treaty announced 
that the member states would “set up amongst themselves a European Defence Community, supra-
national in character, comprising common institutions, common Armed Forces, and a common 
budget” (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 41). 
 
Whilst the ECSC aimed to promote peace through economic integration, the EDC aimed to do the 
same but through defence integration.  The success of the EDC lived and died by the will of the 
French government. The motivation of the EDC for the French government was because of the 
devasting World Wars and the Franco-Prussian war in 1870. With this conflict in mind that meant that 
Germany had invaded France 3 times in the previous 80 years which would have been on the mind of 





Unlike the ECSC which was ratified by the members and would became a model on which could be 
built, the EDC had failed to get the support of the member states who had fears over ceding 
sovereignty to the EDC project (Dwan, 2001). The entire EDC timeline from 1950-1954 was a slow 
process which faced opposition from some of the member states involved and the ruling parties of the 
countries faced a tough sell to their own national governments (Dwan, 2001). Perhaps most 
surprisingly was that despite earlier objections towards the EDC, the US and NATO became strong 
supporters of the EDC after a meeting between Jean Monnet and Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1951, 
Eisenhower was the supreme commander of NATO at this time. Monnet did not have any interest in 
the defensive integration of Europe, which is contrasted with his strong support for the ECSC. It was 
even suggested that the US was the single strongest external force pushing for the EDC, and they held 
sway with the ECSC members because of the large amount aid and support that they were providing 
through the Marshall Plan (Dwan, 2001, p. 156). It was this support which kept the EDC stringing 
along until its failing as the ECSC member states bowed to domestic pressure. The EDC was 
ultimately non-ratified after being voted down by the French National Assembly, a pan-European 
defence force was a bridge too far (Duke & Vanhoonacker, 2017, p. 26). 
 
Despite the failing of the EDC it would not stop successive French Governments from trying to create 
closer defence and foreign policy integration. While the EDC had failed to come to fruition, some of 
its aspects were carried over into the next French-led European integration attempt which was the 
WEU. Like with the ECSC the UK decided to not opt into the EDC and preferred to focus on 
American and NATO integration. 
 
3.6- The Creation of the WEU in 1954 
 
The WEU was created in 1954, was the third iteration of what was originally the Treaty of Dunkirk. 
This Treaty was aimed at creating closer co-operation amongst a variety of different areas for the 
members. The Treaty of Dunkirk was signed in 1947 between France and the UK to counteract any 
possible aggression by Germany and the Soviet Union. This was expanded in 1948 in the Treaty of 
Brussels which brought two developments; the name the Western Union, and the admission of the 
Benelux countries (Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). The WU was quickly passed in 
relevance by other organisations such as NATO and ECSC which performed much of the same tasks 
which the WU was originally envisaged to do. In 1954 the Treaty of Brussels was amended in 
response to these developments and the question over German re-armament, this amendment would 




The history of the WEU has seen it go through periods of inactivity and even irrelevance, as the 
members opted to use other avenues for integration. This is one of the instances where the difference 
in defence priorities between France and the UK came to the fore. Despite being a member of both 
NATO and the WEU, the UK pushed for further integration of NATO and only used the WEU 
sparingly to consult with WEU members. When the UK joined the EEC in in 1973 it consigned the 
WEU to the backseat as it was largely defunct from 1973-1984  (Lanigan, 2015). With the WEU out 
of the picture it left an awkward situation for France because they were outside of NATO structures 
and the WEU was defunct from 1973-1984. 
 
The WEU was reactivated after a meeting between the foreign ministers of the member states in1984. 
This meeting came at the behest of the Belgian and French Governments, and in this meeting, it set 
forth a new agenda; this agenda recognised the significance of the US towards European defence and 
hoped for increased regional military cooperation (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2018). The integration 
preferences for both the UK and France can be seen in this new agenda, the UK’s agenda with the 
recognition of the US and the French agenda with increased regional integration. Despite these 
different agenda’s the EU states within the WEU had manged two successful foreign policy actions in 
its waning years according to DeVore (DeVore, 2009). DeVore suggested that despite an ill-defined 
mandate and weak institutional structures, it proved more than capable of carrying external action 
than other organisations. The WEU coordinated the European efforts in clearing naval mines during 
the Iran-Iraq War (1987-1988) and performed multiple roles during and after the 1991 Gulf War 
(DeVore, 2009, p. 228). 
 
The role that the WEU should play had long been debated by the two foremost defence powers, 
France and the UK. This had been an issue in the 1950’s and this debate continued well into the 
1990’s in the Treaty of Maastricht negotiations. This debate centred around not only the WEU’s role 
within the EC but also how the WEU would interact with NATO. The French President, Francois 
Mitterrand wanted the WEU to be incorporated within EC structures, while British Prime Minister 
John Major did not want WEU integration to come the expense of American involvement in both 
NATO and Europe (Wall, 2008b). 
 
Perhaps the greatest legacy of the WEU was the adoption of the Petersberg tasks. The Petersberg tasks 
were a series of tasks which were adopted by first the WEU and later in the Treaty of Amsterdam.  
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These tasks included Humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in 
crisis management, including peace-making” (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008b, p. 177). 
 
3.7 1957- Rome Treaty 
 
The 1957 Treaty of Rome saw the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the 
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The addition of the EEC and EURATOM is 
considered the start of the European Union as understood today.  While not adding a foreign policy 
capability to the original six and with a focus on economic integration it still added political capability 
through its economic integration. Keukeleire and MacNaughtan note (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 
2008) that the EEC was ‘granted competences in external trade and the conclusions of agreements 
with third states, so while not explicitly gaining foreign policy competence, it would still allow it to be 
an international actor.  
The UK did not join the EEC as it was still committed to the Commonwealth, but it would try to join 
in both 1963 and 1967 but were vetoed by Charles de Gaulle both times. It would not be until de 
Gaulle left the French Presidency in 1969 that the UK would try to join again and eventually join the 
EC in 1973. 
 
3.8 1964- Fouchet Plan- Another French Intiative 
 
Like with the WEU and EDC, the Fouchet Plan was a French attempt at the creation of an integrated 
European political union. The Fouchet Plan as the brainchild of Charles de Gaulle and was an attempt 
to increase political integration and have France be at the head of this political union. De Gaulle had 
multiple attempts at pushing this plan through firstly with Italy in 1959 and then with Germany in 
1960. Jeffrey Vanke (Vanke, 2001) notes that this union would then be able to serve a unique 
balancing role in the realist sense in Europe; “De Gaulle’s France would assert its independence 
between America and Russia, by uniting continental Europe under French leadership”.  
 
The UK was not part of the EC at this stage and this was between the EC members, so they had no 
formal part in the failure of the Fouchet Plan. Because of this they were not a part of the failure of the 
Fouchet Plan, the major push against the Plan came from the Benelux Countries. These countries were 
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highly resistant to the plan because of the fear that it would take power away from the EEC. The UK 
was not part of the EC at this stage they were not involved for the early parts of the Fouchet Plan and 
according to Vanke (Vanke, 2001, p. 96) the French Government had misgivings over the role of the 
UK; “Britain had to be excluded, both because its pretensions and prestige still ran too high, and 
because it was the ‘Trojan Horse’ of American Leadership aspirations in Europe”. 
 
3.9 1970- The Creation of European Political Co-operation 
 
European Political Co-operation (EPC) was the name given to European political integration between 
the members of the EC. This name was given after the Luxembourg Report was adopted in 1970, 
which was published after a study done by the 6 members of the EC. The report stated that there was 
want amongst the member states to co-ordinate foreign policy with a need to intensify political co-
operation, so the world could see that Europe was on a ‘political mission’ (Keukeleire & 
MacNaughtan, 2008). This ‘political mission’ was for the EC to act as a first a regional pacifier in 
Europe and then a global pacifier. Keukeleire and MacNaughtan further suggest that a change in 
national governments in EC member states helped to create this shift towards political integration and 
the end of Charles de Gaulle in France was the removal of a major roadblock towards this political 
integration (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 44). 
 
While the member states expressed a need and want for more coordinated foreign policy between the 
member states before the publication of the Luxembourg Report, the report also stated in more 
explicit terms in what they wanted out of increased political cooperation between the EC members.  
The objectives of this foreign policy mission mentioned above are defined below (Hill & Smith, 
2000). 
• To ensure, through regular exchanges of information and consultations, a better mutual 
understanding on the great international problems 
• To strengthen their solidarity by promoting the harmonisation of their views, the co-
ordination of their positions, and, where it appears possible and desirable 
• Common action 
The objectives above should be taken with a grain of salt, especially with the benefit of hindsight. 
While they state the intended purpose of the EPC, the inter-governmental approach of the EPC would 
mean that it was rarely used for its intended purpose. Podt (Podt, 2014) notes that while EPC 
encouraged member states to take common positions on foreign policy and political issues, it became 
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more of an occasional exchange of opinions rather than effective political tool. This inter-
governmental approach was seemingly preferred by the EC members because it stayed part of the 
political institutions through the 1970’s and 1980’s and would only change through the CFSP reforms 
in the Treaty of Amsterdam, where even though the inter-governmental approach was kept, the 
addition of the role of the High Representative was created to help consolidate views. 
 
3.10 1973- British accession to EC 
 
The UK finally gained accession and joined the EC in 1973. This was after the two failed attempts in 
the 1960s which both had been vetoed by France. Wall (Wall, 2008) notes that during the early 1950’s 
the UK had much larger trade within the Commonwealth countries and it was not until the late 1950’s 
where the trade with the EC members was more significant than with the Commonwealth. This 
economic downturn paired with the political failure in the Suez Crisis in 1956 perhaps shifted British 
eyes towards the EC. 
 
In 1975 the UK held a referendum over the issue of continued membership in the EC. This 
referendum was due to a split in the British Labour Party, but EC membership had strong public 
support and across the political spectrum, so it failed. This split over EC membership is perhaps ironic 
because in future years the Labour Party would be generally more Europhile while the Conservative 
Party would be generally more eurosceptic.  
 
Whilst no institutional changes were made or amendments to any treaties the addition of British soft 
and hard power would have an intangible effect on foreign policy and defence integration of the 
Union as a whole. 
 
3.12 1993- Maastricht Treaty 
 
The Maastricht Treaty saw the addition of many aspects to the capability of the now-named EU, but 
this chapter will focus on the addition of the CFSP as one of the three pillars. The creation of the 
CFSP was an attempt by the member states to improve upon the EPC, which was an inter-
governmental organisation and lacked the will and need to effectively perform there wanted foreign 
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policy goals. It was at this period where Christopher Hill theorised his capability-expectations gap to 
help explain deficiencies in EU foreign policy. It would be easy for one to look at this chapter and 
how the previous foreign policy attempts had failed to create a unified and effective foreign policy 
and come to the same conclusions that Hill came to. This is that despite its economic power and 
weight, the EC had failed miserably to create the same unity and effectiveness in their foreign policy. 
 
Like many of the previous foreign policy and security policy attempts, France saw the Maastricht 
Treaty negotiations as an opportunity to increase their influence as their self-prescribed role as the 
political head of the EU (Irondelle, 2009). It was not only this aspect of the Maastricht Treaty 
negotiations which mirrored previous integration attempts as like with past attempts the integration of 
the newly reunified Germany was at the forefront of the negotiations. Both Habermas (Habermas, 
2002) and Tank (Tank, 1998) suggest that it was the political and economic integration of reunified 
Germany within Eu institutions which played a core part in the Maastricht Treaty negotiations. So far, 
we have two instances of the Maastricht Treaty negotiations mirroring the negotiations and aims of 
the previous integration attempts in these fields, the third instance is British hesitancy towards 
increased integration in these areas. This British hesitancy has been a common theme and will 
continue to be a central theme over the British membership in the EU. 
 
In researching the British and their political system and environment during the Maastricht 
negotiations, one could not help but draw comparisons to the British Government of 2018. The 
similarities are uncanny; a conservative government in where the leader is facing a spilt in their own 
party and even their own cabinet. While Theresa May is facing tough questions over the leaving of the 
EU, John Major was facing questions over the proposed integration increase through the Maastricht 
Treaty. A public spat with the conservative leader of the 1980’s Margaret Thatcher, further heaped the 
pressure on Major who was trying to please both his domestic government and European allies (Wall, 
2008a). The UK played an important role during the negotiation and ratification process because they 
held the Presidency of the Council of the EU during the second half of 1992. The Birmingham 
Council meeting of 1992 came amongst political difficulties both domestically and with tight 
ratification battles in both Denmark and France (Wall, 2008a).  
 
It was perhaps ironic that despite the British hesitancy towards upgrading the EPC into the CFSP, they 
were behind some of the only successful EPC actions in the years it was active. The joint action of the 
EC members against Argentina during the Falklands War, which banned imports and exports to and 
from Argentina. This action only lasted a month because foreign ministers could not agree on a 
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second round of sanctions as debate over the CAP flowed over into other aspects of the EC (Wall, 
2008). 
The core issue which had hamstrung the EPC had been the inter-governmental nature which allowed 
to countries to participated as little or much as they wanted. This inevitably led to little engagement 
between the member states and even less agreement and action on common positions and policy. This 
issue was then passed onto the first iteration of CFSP as like the EPC, was inter-governmental by 
nature. This inter-governmental nature of CFSP would plague the EU during the 1990’s as they 
struggled to effectively deal with the prolonged conflict in Yugoslavia. It would be the experience in 
Yugoslavia which would help shape the CFSP reforms of the Amsterdam Treaty and help to build the 
path towards CSDP legislation. 
 
3.13 1997- Amsterdam Treaty 
 
The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 saw amendments to the Treaty of the European Union with this 
section of the chapter focussing on the amendments made to the CFSP and the build up towards these 
changes. The Treaty saw the creation of the position of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
which was filled by Javier Solana. Much of the negotiation in the lead up towards the Treaty focused 
on the decision-making process of the CFSP with it being overly complicated and the majority voting 
process being rarely used. Spence and Spence (Spence & Spence, 1998) suggest that the CFSP part of 
the Maastricht Treaty was deliberately ambiguous in its aim and objectives and this same ambiguity 
then flowed into the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations. 
 
Even though the inter-governmental approach did not always lead to a strong and coherent policy or 
action, Edwards (Edwards, 2017) suggests that this was by design and preferable to the member 
states. This approach would mean that the member states could be free to pursue their own foreign 
policy and autonomous action if a common approach could not be agreed upon. If common policies or 
decisions could be made or agreed upon, they tended to be less coherent than that of individual actor 
states because of the process used to create the policy (Knodt & Princen, 2003). This approach can be 
seen with both France and the UK, with France pushing for European political integration while 





3.14 1998- Saint-Malo declaration 
 
The Saint-Malo declaration followed the meeting between Chirac and Blair at the resort town of 
Saint-Malo and this was the first step towards defence integration and the creation of the 
ESDP/CSDP. This was significant because this was the first instance where the defence priorities of 
the France and the UK converged. This chapter has shown that throughout its history the France and 
UK have been at other ends of the spectrum regarding European defence integration. So, it was 
somewhat surprising when the two countries finally converged paths on European Defence 
integration. It was perhaps the Yugoslav conflicts of the 1990’s where the largest gap between 
Capabilities and Expectations was exposed as they utterly failed to stop the conflict because of a lack 






















This chapter of the research will follow on from where the last chapter left off and will look at 
different aspects of the CSDP. These aspects will include a description of the CSDP and 
developments it has taken since the 1998 Saint-Malo declaration, looking at where it gains its political 
legitimacy, CSDP missions, the Athena funding mechanism and look at some shortfalls of the CSDP. 
This chapter will look at these specific aspects which make up CSDP policy because they are some of 
the most contentious (funding mechanism) or visible (CSDP missions) aspects of the policy. 
Focussing on these aspects of the policy will further show the different approaches that the UK and 
France have taken to the policy.  This chapter will be a logical step from the previous chapter because 
this is, after years of attempts the current state of EU defence integration. Looking at these different 
aspects of CSDP will then allow us to see how member states can and have contributed to the policy. 
 
While this chapter will have examples of what Member States contribute to the CDSP, more of this 
analysis will follow in the next chapter where the research will look at specifically what the UK has 
contributed across a range of areas towards this policy area. Much of the discussion about the UK’s 
contributions and influence will be contrasted with France because of the key role that the two 
countries played in the formation of the CSDP and as their role as the two largest spending defence 
powers in the EU. This comparison will then be able to feed into future gazing of the CSDP as a 
whole because of the uncertainty over the future of the CSDP and what that they mean for France’s 
role. 
 
4.2- CSDP- The last step in the defence puzzle? 
 
This section of the chapter will focus on developments to the CSDP following the 1998 Saint-Malo 
declaration, with a focus on how the UK moulded and impacted these developments. The role that the 
UK played at these development points will be touched on in this chapter and then will be expanded 
upon further in the next chapter. The reason for this is because the CSDP policy as it stands in 2018 
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did not just spring out of the Saint-Malo declaration in 1998 and it was a process in which different 
capabilities had been built up through various treaties and agreements. 
 
Chapter 2 ended with the Saint-Malo declaration in 1998, signed between France and the UK and saw 
the start first steps towards CSDP. While this research so far has made much of the fact that the St 
Malo Declaration was important because it saw the convergence of France and the UK on the issue of 
European defence initiatives, several scholars have raised questions of whether this was the case. 
Keukelaire and MacNaughtan (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 174) suggest that this was less 
the convergence of the opposing viewpoints of EU defence and more a compromise between the two 
countries. This viewpoint is not just restricted to Keukelaire and MacNaughtan as Howorth (Howorth, 
2000, pp. 384-387) suggested that from a British point of view that the Saint-Malo declaration was 
more of a tactical shift in defensive thinking with an end focus still being on US and NATO 
involvement in European defence initiatives rather than a complete change of thinking more in line 
with the French approach to defence integration. Howorth further suggests that the reasons for this 
‘Atlanticist’ attitude boiled down to four reasons; Confidence and closeness to the American 
Hegemon; lack of confidence in European structures; concerns over discrimination towards European 
NATO members who were not part of the EC and feared that closer EU relations would jeopardize the 
Atlantic relationship (Howorth, 2000, p. 378). Interestingly, this feeling was somewhat mutual as the 
US saw the UK as its traditional transatlantic ally, with newer European members of NATO also 
having a closer relationship with the US than some of the older members of the agreement (Davison, 
2015, p. 259). This closer relationship towards the US could help to explain the divisions and factions 
that sprung up over the 2003 invasion of Iraq which saw a split in some EU members joining the 
coalition and others opting not to. Nether the less the Saint-Malo declaration will see France and the 
UK lay the platform to defence integration, and to help lay out an action plan to develop a framework 
to overcome the capability gap in this area. While there has been differing views over the motivation 
for UK involvement and wanted outcomes from the process, they eventually did reach a level of 
consensus with France over what this defence initiative should be able to achieve.  
 
The next 5 years saw rapid development in different aspects of CSDP policy, policy which was 
developed with comparative speed and haste with compared with the previously described attempts at 
defence integration. This is noteworthy when one looks at the previous chapter and the number of 
previous attempts at defence integration which had seen France and the UK at logger heads over the 
proposed direction of defence initiatives. Some thought must be given then because if what the 
scholars in the previous paragraph argued is true, then this development would be a much more drawn 
out process like previous defence attempts because one of the two founding members of the policy 
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would be dragging their feet. Rather than a dragging of feet it was only 5 years after the Saint-Malo 
declaration when the first CSDP mission was launched in the former Yugoslavia. One could then 
argue that perhaps the UK was a more willing driving force of CSDP and was not just paying it lip 
service as some of the previous literature suggested. 
 
4.3- Headline Goals- Building operational capacity and capability 
 
The Saint-Malo Declaration was considered the start of ESDP/CSDP, but it did not lay down a 
concrete or extensive plan over what the policy would do or what it would look like. It would be the 
Helsinki Headline Goals (HHG) which were established after the European Council Summit in 
Helsinki (Hyde-Price, 2005) in 1999 which would provide the first objectives and goals that the 
CSDP should fulfil. The CSDP like many different areas of competence are constantly evolving and 
changing and this can be seen through subsequent Headline Goals. The Headline Goals do go some 
way to lay the framework for military force projection but did little to address the political concerns 
and realities on the deployment of these forces.  
 
At the previously mentioned Helsinki summit in 1999 the EU member states defined what the HHG 
would be: “Cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to 
deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1-year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons 
capable of the full range of Petersburg Tasks” (Quille, 2006, p. 9). The 3 Petersberg Tasks6  which 
had been agreed upon and adopted by the WEU in 1992, these principles were then subsequently 
adopted by EU for CSDP. The two European defence drivers, the France and UK were highly 
influential in this first formation period. Firstly, the CSDP was adopting structures from the French-
led WEU and much of the decisions undertaken at the EU Council in Helsinki had been drafted by the 
British Ministry of Defence (Howorth, 2014b, p. 79).  The following year at the Nice European 
Council of December 2001 approved decision-making structures in the form of the Political and 
Security Committee, the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS). These 
targets were first given a 5-year time frame for 2004, but perhaps unsurprisingly it was clear to 
European Leaders that these targets were not going to be met. A catalogue was made in any case, and 
this catalogue highlighted were the deficiencies were in capability commitments (Schmitt, 2005). 
These deficiencies were then acted upon by way of the 2001 Laeken European Summit were the EU 
Council decided to launch the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP). This plan was to feature 
                                                          
6 The 3 Petersberg Tasks were peace-making, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. 
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panels of ‘national experts’ who would deliver possible solutions on what capability was needed. 
These panels were to be overseen by the newly created EUMS. 
The ECAP process was to have four guiding principles; 
1. The improvement of the effectiveness and efficiency of European defence efforts, 
enhancing cooperation between member states or groups of member states. 
2. A ‘bottom up’ approach to European defence cooperation, relying on voluntary national 
commitments 
3. Coordination between EU member states as well as coordination with NATO 
4. Public support through ECAP’s transparency and visibility 
The above guiding principles (Schmitt, 2005) have a very ‘European’ feel because these principles 
can be seen in later iterations of similar defence initiatives such as the European Defence Agency 
(EDA) and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) initiative. With the adoption of the HHG 
and ECAP these were steps towards filling in the capability-expectations gap, which as previously 
described had long been a key criticism of the EU in the foreign policy field. Much of this criticism 
had focused on that the EU had over promised and under delivered on foreign policy competences, 
and the initial time frame and expected competences for the HHG was highly ambitious.  
 
A new headline goal was adopted after the EU council Meeting in June 2004, which was subsequently 
called the 2010 Headline Goal (HG 2010). With HG 2010 much of the debate and focus centred not 
just on force projection of the CSDP, but also the nitty gritty aspects of the policy, most importantly 
when to use this power projection. Perhaps the biggest issue was that for the HHG to be achieved then 
it would require a boost in defence spending from the EU in the face of global and regional economic 
downturns in the late 2000s. HG 2010 was adopted to reflect the new European Security Strategy 
(ESS) which had been adopted in 2003. As the name suggests, the ESS was to guide CSDP and help 
create foreign policy coherence amongst member states, so that these new competences which had 
sprung up since the Saint-Malo declaration could be effectively carried out. The ESS had a focus on 
‘effective multilateralism’ and was the brain child of the first High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
(HR/VP), Javier Solana. As will be expanded upon later in this chapter, the position of the HR/VP had 
been another clash of ideologies between France and the UK and reflected what each country wanted 
out of the position. For scholars the adoption of the ESS further muddied the waters over what kind of 
international actor the EU and whether it had gone from a civilian actor to a military actor (Aggetsam, 




4.4- Berlin-Plus Agreement 
 
The Berlin Plus Agreement was first mooted in the 1990’s and the idea was for co-operation between 
NATO and the WEU, specifically the use of NATO resources in emergency situations. This was a 
long-drawn-out process with total negotiation time lasting from 1996 until 2002. The Berlin-Plus 
Agreement highlights two things; the importance of the US and NATO to EU defence capabilities and 
the importance of France and UK to EU defence capabilities. Since there will be less reliance on 
‘conventional’ pitched battles (Lugar, 2000, p. 27), states will need capability to be able to deploy 
rapidly overseas via strategic airlift. Only France and the UK have the capability within the EU to 
undertake strategic airlift, so it shows the importance of not just the UK to EU defence but also the 
importance of NATO. It was not just the material infrastructure which would be of great use to EU 
foreign policy action, but also access to NATO planning structures which had been used effectively 
on the Balkans in the 1990’s (Lucarelli & Menotti, 2006, p. 150).  Perhaps more importantly the 
Berlin-Plus Agreement provided a defence link to EU member states who were not part of NATO 
such as Austria. 
 
4.5- The Lisbon Treaty- Tangible defence steps 
 
The Lisbon Treaty which was signed in 2007 and came into power in 2009 was important to the 
CSDP and CFSP for a multitude of reasons. Firstly, this was the first Treaty since important 
developments such as the EDA came into power and enshrined these into European treaties. This is 
noted by Laursen (Laursen, 2009, p. 353) where the CSDP was given more emphasis on operational 
capacity in both civilian and military assets. More CSDP tasks were added alongside with the 
Petersberg Tasks which had been adopted by the WEU in 1992 and then later adopted as the basis for 
the CSDP, these tasks included;” joint disarmament operations, post-conflict stabilisation as well as to 
“fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their 
territories” (Laursen, 2009, p. 353). The Lisbon Treaty introduced further additions to CSDP with 
PESCO and along with the EDA was aimed at improving and increasing efficiency in CSDP. The EU 
Global Strategy (EUGS) which was released in 2016 as a successor to the ESS further aimed to 
increase capability in this area with the introduction of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence 
(CARD) which called for greater ‘synchronization and integration’ (Agency, 2018). This is perhaps 




 The additions to the CFSP also aimed to make the EU a more coherent foreign policy actor. The 
creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) was aimed creating a foreign policy 
department akin to the FCO in the UK or MFAT in New Zealand. This also saw the appointment of a 
second HR/VP after Javier Solana who had come into power with the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, this 
appointment was not until 1999 and was the subject of two years of political wrangling. 
Unsurprisingly this political wrangling over the position of the HR/VP was between France and the 
UK, the differing points of view reflected the points of view which France and the UK had always 
presented to EU defence integration. Howorth (Howorth, 2014, p. 38) notes that France wanted a 
‘high-profile heavyweight’ while the UK wanted a mid-career civil servant. Javier Solana, the first 
HR/VP was more in the mould of the French ideal as he was a former Spanish foreign minister and 
NATO Secretary General. The Second HR/VP Catherine Ashton was lamented as inexperienced and 
uncharismatic and more in line with the British view of the HR/VP (Howorth, 2014, p. 39).  
 
Catherine Ashton was followed by Federica Mogherini in 2014, Mogherini was much more in the 
Solana mould than the Ashton one and was in charge when the EUGS was released in 2016 and which 
promised ‘principled pragmatism’ (European External Action Service , 2016). The EUGS came 
amongst unprecedented external challenges facing the EU and the EUGS would provide a blueprint 
on how the EU would act with the world around them. The EUGS promoted closer defence 
integration and like all previous defence attempts the additions proposed in the EUGS relies on 
multilateralism amongst the members of the EU and there lies it weakness. The EUGS requires closer 
integration, but nothing ‘forcing’ the issue so more Eurosceptic countries may not consent or drag 
their feet to proposed changes. The loss of the UK will not see just a loss of important military 
hardware and infrastructure but also of a critical voice to push back against French dominance of this 
sector. 
 
4.6- Where does the CSDP gain its legitimacy? 
 
CSDP is the latest step in the EU defence process, a process that is aiming to give the EU defence 
legitimacy which can go hand and hand with foreign policy legitimacy. This need for legitimacy has 
been mentioned multiple times, and the EU looks for legitimacy through CSDP missions which can 
be either civilian or military by nature and happen after multilateral agreements with its member 
states. CSDP missions and operations are the show of external force of the CSDP and are usually 
done in conjunction and offer a similar role to UN peacekeeping missions. CSDP missions therefore 
29 
 
are not restricted to just EU member states, but done in conjunction with third-party countries, New 
Zealand has partaken in several CSDP missions in the past. 
 
Like most of the institutions in the EU, CSDP gains its legitimacy through the collective actions of the 
member states as they decide where to act and what forces and resources to commit. The CSDP is 
inter-governmental by nature so decision whether to engage in missions and specific areas of co-
operation. This inter-governmental nature allows to member states to decide firstly whether to engage 
in a CSDP operation and secondly what level of involvement and funding they give to the mission. 
This is a double-edge sword for CSDP because even if a mission can be agreed upon, the mandate is 
not always overly ambitious because of the trouble in getting member states to agree. Relating these 
missions back to the capability-expectations gap, it is case of the EU promising or aiming to fulfil a 
role in the international system but lacking political will amongst its members to carry out these 
missions. It is due to this that CSDP missions aim to work in conjunction with other organisations and 
partner countries. This drive for legitimacy has been long been entrenched in the policy documents 
and treaties which focus on CSDP, with CSDP relevant information being in Chapters 41-47 of the 
TEU. Chapter 41 is perhaps the most ‘relevant’ and contentious because in not only lays out the rules 
for CSDP missions but also concerns itself with the funding of CSDP missions and the funding of the 
CFSP. The issue of funding remains a contentious point of the policy with France and the UK once 
again on opposite sides of the issue, which will be explored further on in this chapter. The EU plans 
their CSDP action to be done in conjunction with UN ideals (Eriksen, 2006) (Legrand, 2017), but 
does not require an explicit UN mandate when undertaking CSDP missions but is ‘highly desirable’ 
(Matlary, 2009) to obtain one. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) exercises political and 
military control over CSDP operations as outlined in Chapter 41. 
 
4.7- CSDP Operations- The manifestation of legitimacy abroad? 
 
CSDP operations and missions tend to be the most public and ‘visible’ aspects of CSDP and therefore 
tend to be how CSDP and the EU is viewed (Tardy, 2015, p. 36). These operations come in the form 
of the deployment of military or civilian resources to countries to fulfil a variety of role and 
objectives. These operations come in all shapes and sizes and do not come in a one size fits all policy. 
This could be the physical embodiment of the aforementioned ‘principled pragmatism’ which was 
adopted in the EUGS. These missions are a tool for both the EU and its member states to fulfil foreign 
policy action and provide legitimacy to both the EU and its member states. These missions can vary 
from capacity building and military training missions such as the different missions which have been 
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operating in Mali since 2013 or the anti-piracy mission which has been operating off the coast of 
Somalia since 2008 (Skeppstrom, 2015). These two missions provide contrasting examples of how 
EU member states can interact with CSDP operations. Furthermore, these two operations are of 
interest because of the role that France and the UK have played historically in these operations and 
what Brexit means for their future. 
 
After decades of religious and civil unrest, armed conflict erupted in Northern Mali in early 2012 
between terrorists and the democratically elected Government. While Mali had never been 
particularly peaceful there had never been such conflict that it threatened a civil war and this 
understandably worried European leaders as it came amongst the Arab Spring which was erupting 
through the region. This conflict and region would have been of interest to French leadership for a 
variety of reasons; the colonial links of the two countries, a common language and concern over the 
conflict from spiralling over into neighbouring regions as the Libyan Conflict had done. A year after 
the conflict started France launched armed action in the country (Operation Serval) after a request for 
aid from the Malian Government and after a UNSC resolution. 
 
 Operation Serval was followed by CSDP action in the form of capacity building missions (EUTM 
Mali, EUCAP Sahel Mali) which was done in conjunction with 21 EU countries, 3rd party countries 
and local inter-governmental organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS). EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Mali and Operation Serval links back to realist theory 
described earlier that despite giving up some sovereignty to the EU through CSDP and CFSP, it 
allows member states to pursue foreign policy agenda through both national and multi-lateral fields as 
France did (Reichwein, 2015, pp. 109-120). The action in Mali also provides an effective case study 
in how CSDP operations and actions are decided upon in the form of UNSC mandates, a plea for 
assistance and through working with third party countries and organisations. This operation also is 
interesting because it has what I would call a low ‘buy-in”, which can be completed by most of the 
armed forces of the member states as they require technical and drilling which could be completed by 
nearly all member states. Contrast this to EUNAVOR Atalanta which by nature is a maritime 
operation so it leans heavily on member states who have the national capacity to perform such tasks. 
EUNAVOR Atalanta will be explored further in the next chapter as a case study because of the role of 
the role the UK plays in that operation. 
 




The previous section noted that the funding for CSDP operations was entrenched in Chapter 41 of the 
TEU following the Lisbon Treaty, but this is only partly true. Chapter 41 only focuses on the funding 
of CSDP civilian missions but not the military missions, so after the first CSDP operation in the 
former Yugoslavia which was funded on an ad-hoc basis a new mechanism was needed to help fund 
future missions. 
This process for funding CSDP missions is called the Athena mechanism, the funding falls under two 
broad categories; common costs and national borne ‘where they fall’ costs. The Athena mechanism 
has been in force since February 2004 meaning that the first two CSDP missions were financed in ‘ad 
hoc’ arrangements which were funded by the MS according to their gross national income (GNI), 
these ad-hoc arrangements were overly bureaucratic and helped the push towards a proper funding 
mechanism (Nováky, 2016, pp. 216-219). Article 41 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
provides the framework for the funding of civilian CSDP missions (Council, 2014) while military 
missions would be funded through the Athena mechanism (Council, 2015, p. 9). 
Funding for CSDP military missions is unique in the fact that it falls outside of the EU budget because 
operations which have defence or military implications cannot be financed from the Union budget and 
the common costs for these military operations are funded through the Athena mechanism (Council, 
2014). Since common costs make up 5-15% of any CSDP mission budget (Nováky, 2016, p. 217) 
(Terpan, 2014, p. 221), the majority of CSDP mission costs are funded through the nation borne or 
‘where they fall’ costs. This means that wealthier countries such as France and the UK would bare a 
larger amount of the common costs, and then for more complex missions were needing to provide 
material which less-wealthy countries may not have access to. Perhaps unsurprisingly the Athena 
mechanism has long been a point of contention between France and the UK, because France wants to 
expand common costs while the UK wants to keep the status quo and has vetoed suggestions that 
these costs should be increased. 
 
4.9- Shortfalls of CSDP? 
 
Throughout this study many different areas of contention have been raised about how the CSDP 
operates and issues it faces. Perhaps one that is obvious by now is the multilateralism that lies at the 
heart of the decision-making process, while inclusive is somewhat unwieldy (Dari, et al., 2012). This 
is by no means the only issue facing the CSDP, many others such as undecisive mandates, lack of 
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suitable equipment and funding also plague these missions. But the lack of political will shown by 
member states to agree to operations is the biggest hamstring. 
While it is perhaps unfair to call the CSDP a failure, there is undoubtedly shortfalls to the policy 
which have been raised in early sections and these issues that are not unique to CSDP and tend to act 
as a driver for future improvements in policy areas (Glaurdic, 2011). While these shortfalls are 
nothing on the scale compared to the lack of action or political will in Yugoslavia in the 1990’s 
similar issues still plague the decision-making process of the CSDP. Since decisions and operations 
require unanimity by the involved parties, the mandates tend to be ‘bland’ or uninventive because of 
the need for so many partners to agree to the same decision. 
Despite the delegation of some powers to the EU, the member states are still at the heart of the CSDP 


















Chapter 5- The UK and CSDP 
5.1- Introduction 
 
This chapter of the study will focus on the materialistic relationship between the UK and the CSDP. 
While previous chapters of research have focused on the quantitate impact of the UK on CSDP, this 
chapter will focus more on the qualitative impact that the UK has had. Material in this case refers to 
manpower, monetary funding and the use of strategic planning and equipment. This chapter will look 
at what amount of funding the UK gives to CSDP and how that compares with other Countries, look 
at manpower given to CSDP missions with reference to a specific operation and then will look 
towards the future of the UK-CSDP relationship. The Previous chapters have focused on the UK’s 
impact on the decision-making process of the CSDP and of the build-up of foreign policy capability 
for EU institutions, the reason for this is because up until contemporary times the CSDP has been 
about wrangling over the creation of foreign policy institutions and little about demonstrably effective 
foreign policy action. These chapters have shown the long and arduous process of trying to create EU 
autonomous capability and the seeming handbrake role which the UK has played.  
 
By reviewing a mixture of official EU and UK documents and scholarly articles we can gain a further 
understanding of the impact and what the potential loss of the UK could be. This impact is a challenge 
to measure for researchers because of the funding system in place. The previously described Athena 
mechanism funds between 5-15% of military CSDP operations and the rest of the funding is 
shouldered by participating member states, dependent on the amount of support that the member state 
decides to give to an operation. The information on cost/expenditure put towards CSDP operations 
comes in the form of personnel or equipment supplied, so it becomes hard to evaluate the total cost of 
what member states contribute outside the common costs. 
 
Wealthier and more militarily capable countries are being asked to contribute more through common 
costs and then the using of equipment/materials that only some countries have access to. Denmark 
who is the only country in the EU who has an CSDP opt out so does not pay towards the common 
costs funded via GNI and does participate in military CSDP operations so do not pay towards this at 
all. Compare this with the UK who would be paying higher amounts of the common costs due to 
higher GNI whilst supplying high cost equipment such as naval vessels and patrol aircraft which not 




5.2- How much does the UK contribute financially towards the CSDP? 
 
In previous chapters this study has tried to argue the qualitative impact the UK has had on CSDP, this 
section we will be looking at funding charts from the UK and the EU to see what qualitative impact 
the UK has had on CSDP. This study has previously mentioned the different funding process for both 
civilian and military CSDP operations, with civilian missions being funded through CFSP funding 
and military missions being paid through the Athena mechanism and the “lie where they fall” costs.  
 
The CFSP civilian operation budget  for 2018 is €327.6 million (Union, 2018, p. L57/1309) with the 
UK currently funding 15% of this budget (Parliament, 2018). The 2018 budget is up €1 million from 
2017 and over €100 million from 2016, but this number seems to rise and fall dependent on what 
missions are being carried out. For 2018, the UK is funding €49,140,000 of the €327.6 million budget 
put aside for civilian CSDP7 operations making the UK one of the three biggest funders alongside 
Germany and France. This means that when the UK leaves the EU, the CFSP budget for civilian 
CSDP operations will be 15% less doubled with a loss of UK staff working on CSDP operations (see 
Figure 1). So, in post-Brexit CFSP operations we could see either see a drop in the number of Civilian 
CSDP operations or remaining member states will have to make-up the UK’s part of the budget. 
 
The funding mechanisms for military CSDP operations makes it difficult in trying to research how 
much each state gives as common costs only account for 5-15% of an operation budget. Nováky in 
(Nováky, 2016, p. 221) came up with a influence ratio of the Athena process which is used as a tool to 
roughly predict influence within the CSDP by combining GNI with how much a member state has 
contributed to CSDP operations through personnel and equipment numbers. Germany had the highest 
ratio at 1.00 because of its high GNI and its large amount of personnel within CSDP operations, while 
France and the UK were both at 0.82 because of their comparatively high GNI and their deployment 
of personnel and equipment. Nováky noted that even through the UK had contributed only a small 
percentage of total personnel the amount of planes and naval vessels deployed to operations in the 
Mediterrainean and Somalia offset this. This is interesting because even though Germany is the 
largest financial contributor its poltical influence pales in comparison to the French-British ‘engine’ of 
European security integration (Faleg, 2016, p. 2). This does raise interesting questions about the 
future of military CSDP operations because even through they will lose fundig and capability with the 
                                                          
7 All ten Civilian CSDP operations are either crisis management or non-proliferation operations. 
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loss of the UK, they have long vetoed closer integration in this area so a German-French engine may 
see an expansion of CSDP operations without the UK pulling the handbrake. 
 
5.3- How many personnel does the UK contribute to both Military and 
Civilian CSDP operations? 
This section of the study will look at the amount of UK personnel deployed to CSDP operations in 
2018, this data was gathered from policy documents provided to the House of Lords looking at the 
CSDP policy. I would have preferred to be able to get staffing levels for the previous 5 years to show 
the increase or decrease overtime and see if there was increase or decrease from the 2015 British 
General Election until after the Brexit vote in June 2016. Operation deployment levels are done on a 
case by case basis and these are not always published so makes it nearly impossible to get a year on 
year of UK staffing levels. Instead by looking at the 2018 staff levels we can see the contemporary 
levels of contribution by the UK and it can show what CSDP will be losing from operations when the 
UK leaves the EU.  
Despite being a core political driver of the CSDP the UK has consistently ranked lowly in the number 
of personnel that it has deployed in CSDP operations, with only 4% of total personnel deployed being 
from the UK which is on par with Greece (Faleg, 2016, p. 1) (Lords, 2018, p. 38). They are ranked 5th 
in personnel to military operations and 7th in civilian operations, which is a surprise when it is one of 
the few NATO members who are spending 2% of their GDP on defence. These comparatively low 
rankings make the massive spike in personnel to EUAVFOR Atalanta more intriguing because it is 
such an outlier. 
Table 3: UK staff on civilian CSDP operations (2018) 
Civilian CSDP operation UK personnel deployed 
EUAM Ukraine 6 
EUMM Georgia 8 
EUPOL COPPS (Palestinian Territories) 1 
EUBAM Rafah (Palestinian Territories) 0 
EUAM Iraq 0 
EUBAM Libya 0 
EUCAP Sahel Mali 0 
EUCAP Sahel Niger 0 
EUCAP Somalia 2 





Sourced from: UK Parliament – European Union Committee: Brexit: Common Security and Defence 
Policy missions and operations. (Parliament, 2018) 
Figure 1 shows the amount of personnel deployed by the UK in civilian CSDP missions in 2018, this 
number ranks 7th amongst member states with Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, France and 
Finland or providing more personnel towards civilian CSDP operations. This number is surprisingly 
low considering the resources that are available to the UK and their role as the driver of CSDP. There 
are several possible reasons for these low participation rates in both civilian and military CSDP 
operations (see table 4) the most popular being that the low participation showing the disapproval or 
dissatisfaction or even simply not caring of the CSDP by the UK. Looking at the low numbers of 
Figures 1 and 2 make the numbers attributed to EUNAVFOR Somalia stick out even more, a possible 
explanation being that this is the time where a CSDP operation lined up and co-ordinated with 
national self-interest of the UK and perhaps the UK would have been here without CSDP. This is an 
interesting parallel to note with the French involvement in Mali which included both autonomous 
foreign policy action followed by joint European action in the area. This also highlights some of the 
shortfalls of the CSDP policy and other inter-governmental organisations; getting so many different 




Table 4:UK Staff on military CSDP operations (2018) 
Military CSDP Operation UK Personnel deployed 
EUFOR (Operation) Althea 8 
EUNAVFOR Med (Operation Sophia) 6 
EUTM Mali 8 
EUTM RCA 0 
EUNAVFOR Somalia (Operation Atalanta) 56 + Operation Commander 
EUTM Somalia 4 
Total: 82 
 
Sourced from: UK Parliament – European Union Committee: Brexit: Common Security and Defence 
Policy missions and operations. (Parliament, 2018) 
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Table 4 shows the UK personnel which have been deployed to military CSDP operations in 2018, 
apart from EUNAVFOR Atalanta these numbers are relatively light and ranks 5th most in 
contributions after France, Italy, Germany and Spain (Faleg, 2016, p. 1). 
 
5.4- EUNAVFOR Atalanta 
The UK contribute a large % of the common costs for military CSDP operations and have contributed 
to 11 CSDP military operations of which they have varying levels of involvement in. This will take a 
specific look at EUNAVFOR Atalanta which is a CSDP anti-piracy operation based off the Coast of 
Somalia. There a several reasons to take a closer look at this operation: 
• The Operational Headquarters Facilities (OHQ) for EUNAVFOR Atalanta are based in 
Northwood in the UK which also houses the NATO naval command (Newson, 2016, p. 18).  
• 60% of the OHQ staff are from the UK and the Operation Commander is from the UK 8. 
• By and far the largest deployment of UK troops towards a CSDP operation, larger than the 
rest of the other operations combined. 
• New Zealand Relevance- NZ has provided maritime reconnaissance aircraft and taken part in 
EUNAVFOR Atalanta and is one of two CSDP missions in which NZ has taken part in. 
Shows how third-party countries can interact with the CSDP and how the New Zealand 
Defence Force (NZDF) interacts with international organisations overseas (NZDF, 2011) 
(Somalia, 2014). 
• Provides contrast with CSDP operations in Mali and how France has interacted with the 
CSDP.  
• Done in conjunction with UN and other international operations in the area. 
• Third party countries cannot run OHQ nor can the Operation Commander be from a third 
country- meaning that there will be a change in both the OHQ and the Operation Commander 
for EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the OHQ is being moved to Rota in Spain by March 29, 2019 
(Web, 2018). 
As has been talked about previously and from what can be seen in Figure 2 the UK has contributed 
extensively towards EUNAVFOR Atalanta in terms of personnel whilst also providing OHQ and the 
Operation Commander. Like most CSDP operations EUNAVFOR Atalanta’s legal basis is based on 
UN resolutions and it had an extensive mandate to combat piracy in the area: 
• Protect World Food Programme (WFP) vessels delivering aid to displaced persons in 
Somalia, and African Union Mission on Somalia (AMISOM) shipping. 
                                                          
8 Appointed in 2017 
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• Deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the Somalia Coast  
• Protect vulnerable shipping off the Somali Coast on a case by case basis  
• In addition, the EUNAVFOR also contributes to the monitoring of fishing activities off the 
coast of Somalia.  
(Somalia, 2014) 
EUNAVFOR Atalanta is done in conjunction with EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Somalia. Over 20 EU 
states have contributed to EUNAVFOR in various ways, either through patrol aircraft, maritime 
vessels or through Staff officers at the OHQ. This operation has been going since 2008 and has a 
mandate until 2020, it has been credited with reducing piracy in the area. Whilst this operation may 
have been effective in reducing piracy numbers it still comes across fundamental problems in which 
many of these CSDP operations come across; many member states don’t have the capability to 
contribute. This means that the UK, France, Spain and Italy would have to via the common costs and 
then pay the “costs where they fall”, which in this case is expensive operational equipment. This 
burden on the wealthier contributors will only increase when the UK leaves because that is one less 
supplier of maritime vessels and patrol aircraft. On the other hand, since the UK has contributed so 
much to this operation compared to other CSDP operations they may continue to contribute as a third-
party member. 
 
In conclusion the amount of support given to CSDP operations by the UK is surprisingly low given 
their key role in the creation of the CSDP and the massive amount of capability that they possess as a 
country. But then again by looking through the previous chapters we can see that they have often been 
a handbrake to the further development of initiatives such as the European Defence Agency (EDA) 
and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and even earlier than that when they preferred to 
look at European defence and security integration through NATO and bilateral channels rather than 
EU channels. 
 
5.5- Future Gazing- what does the post-Brexit relationship look like? 
 
This section of the chapter will be gazing into the future and trying to predict what the future of the 
UK-CSDP relationship will look like. This is hard to predict as we will not know what the final 
divorce paper between the UK and the EU will look like. No matter what the divorce bill will be, it is 
unlikely that it will be a complete separation of the UK and CSDP, because of links through bi-lateral 
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agreements and through organisations such as NATO. The link between NATO and the Berlin-Plus 
agreement means that there will still be contact and co-operation between the UK and CSDP. 
 
The French-UK relationship has been described as the engine which drives CSDP and European 
defence integration. A more apt metaphor for this would be that it is a French engine and steering with 
German wheels and a UK handbrake. While the car starts, hey start to decide which direction to go 
they apply power to the wheels before being stopped in its tracks by the brakes. So, this raises the 
question of who takes over the brakes when the UK leaves does it leave France as the main driver or 
do Germany take a more active role. If Germany were to take a more active or leadership roll it may 
see a large increase in the Community method of decision making and even more institutionalisation 
of the CSDP. One topic of discussion will be the creation of a central OHQ for CSDP missions rather 
than the current process of borrowing off  
 
Much has been made of what the future relationship between the UK and the CSDP will be, there 
have been reports and policy documents produced by the UK, the EU and think tanks. Many of these 
focus on the loss of EU capability and overall global footprint with Brexit, but also the loss of CSDP 
agenda setting capability by the UK  (Faleg, 2016, p. 2), (Newson, 2016, p. 18), (Miller, 2016, pp. 
164-173) (Black, et al., 2016, pp. 68-70). The EU may still be able to contribute to CSDP, but it is 
unlikely that it would be given decision making or agenda setting power. That raises questions over 
whether a country like the UK would be involved in CSDP operations if they had no say on the 
agenda. While others focused on how the UK could still contribute to many of the different aspects of 
CSDP through a variety of models which stress different levels of partnership and participation 
(Whitman, 2016b, pp. 43-50). Perhaps the biggest change will be the possible increase in European 
defence integration amongst the member states. EDA, CARD and PESCO are all on horizon all 
aiming to increase efficiencies and integration amongst the member states. 
 
Perhaps the most interesting relationship will be between the NATO, the UK and reaming EU NATO 
members. Even if there had been a freezing in the relationship between EU NATO members and 
different American administrations, this would be a drop in the bucket between compared to the 
relationship between these countries and the Trump administration. While his Defence Secretary 
Mattis has been supportive of NATO, Trump has long been critical of NATO (Stewart & Emmott, 
2018). The disdain that Trump shows towards the alliance hinges on his assertion that the European 
allies owe sums of money to the United States, this view can be traced back to ads that Trump ran in 
the 1980’s which were critical of NATO (D'Antonio, 2015). This point of view must be troubling 
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towards the UK and the other European NATO members because even though members of the 
administration such as Mattis are supportive of NATO, Trump has shown he does not always take his 
foreign policy advisors’ advice (Stewart & Emmott, 2018). 
 
Chapter 6- Conclusion  
 
The UK has often been described as an uneasy member of the EU and this could easily describe the 
role that they have played in CSDP and defence integration. Going back to the 1950’s they refused to 
join European led initiatives and preferred to pursue defence integration through closer relationships 
with the USA. This hesitancy and uneasiness did not disappear overtime, even after joining European 
initiatives such as the WEU and the EPC they still pursued the NATO relationship over all else. These 
organisations were largely ineffective, yet aspects were carried over and adopted by EU institutions. 
Throughout many of these processes the UK has played the role of a manager and advisory role rather 
than taking the French model and trying to be at the forefront and leading of the decision-making 
process. This does not mean that they were not an agenda setter, but successive British Governments 
took a far more cautious role and view of CSDP compared to their French and German counterparts. 
 
This hesitancy was not unique to just the UK though, as the inter-governmental organisational 
structure in many of the early defence integration attempts showed the apparent lack of political will 
amongst the member states unless it was of a national interest. It was not until the Yugoslav failures 
of the 1990’s which finally forced the hand of France and the UK. It was here that the first proper 
steps towards an integrated European foreign policy capability were introduced. It oversaw the first 
CSDP operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bih) and contributed heavily towards these operations 
in terms of financing and the supply of personnel and material. Contributions to CSDP operations 
may have waned in recent years but does not take away from the important role the UK plays as the 
engine of the CSDP. While CSDP has not fulfilled all the possible functions first theorized by 
Christopher Hill, the UK has helped to fund and develop foreign policy capability which can be used 
in conjunction and compliment other organisations and regional groups. 
 
Despite the UK leaving the EU, there will still be strong defence ties through bi-lateral agreement 
between many of the major powers in Germany and the UK. The Trump Government may also be an 
41 
 
effective tool to convince the UK to continue to work as a third country in CSDP operations and 
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